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I. INTRODUCTION

A child born today faces a very different world than that which
existed some two centuries ago when the Constitution was written.
Many unimaginable technological and societal changes have occurred
which tremendously enrich the lives of our youth.! Institutions such as
the family, school, and justice system have undergone radical changes
as well.2 Similarly, the children of our society have changed, and many
* I write this for my brother, Joshua Witkin. I'd like to thank Professor Wendy
Fitzgerald for her support, criticism, and guidance.
1. See, e.g., Adam Rogers & Jennifer Tanaka, A Real Car-Toon, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16,
1995, at 10 (describing a CD-Rom game for children).
2. See Ira C. Lupu, The Separationof Powers and the Protectionof Children, 61 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1317, 1323-24 (1994) (discussing changes in family dynamics); The Early Juvenile
Court: Historical Origins and Philosophy, The Invention of the Juvenile Court, JUVENILE
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of the early assumptions about children no longer hold true.' Whether
all of these changes have benefitted children and society is debatable.
However, just as change necessitated reevaluating the constitutional
status of women and blacks," recognizing and acknowledging these
changes mandates critical review of the Supreme Court's constitutional
treatment of children.
"Children's rights" is an ambiguous term. The rhetoric of "rights"
usually refers to individual freedoms.5 However, the phrase children's
rights may refer to protection from abuse and neglect, to noninterference
from the state in familial child rearing, or to recognition of the child as
an independent person.6 For the purposes of this Note, children's rights
means the guarantees which the Constitution gives children. This Note
suggests that these guarantees, while primarily measures to safeguard the
development of the autonomous individual, are not necessarily exclusive
of the other meanings of children's rights. Hence, having "rights" does
not necessarily mean that children need be abandoned to their own
devices.
This Note develops the concept of children's rights. Initially, Part II
reviews the legal treatment of children, from common law to Supreme
Court decisions. This history reveals three problems with the Court's
jurisprudential treatment of children. First, the Court often decides cases
which significantly impact children's lives without regard to the views
and desires of the child.' Second, in many cases the Court's decisions
rest on arbitrary line drawing which results in inconsistent and unjustifiable treatment of children.8 Finally, the Court's constitutional interpreta-

JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY 550-57 (F. Faust & P. Brantingham eds., 1974), reprinted in CHILD,

987-91 (Robert
H. Mnookin & D. Kelly Weisberg eds., 1989) [hereinafter Early Juvenile Court] (discussing the
development and early ideals of the juvenile justice system); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-19
(1967) (questioning the ability of the juvenile justice system to fulfill its foundational ideals).
3. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-17.
FAMILY AND STATE PROBLEMS AND MATERIAL ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW

4. Charles D. Gill, Essay on the Status of the American Child, 2000 A.D.: Chattel or

ConstitutionallyProtected Child-Citizen?, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 543, 544 (1991) (referring to
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution).
5. See Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to
Children's Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 15-16 (1986).
6. Bruce C. Hafen, Children'sLiberationandthe New Egalitarianism:Some Reservations
About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 644; Minow, supra note

5, at 18.
7. See infra notes 25-43 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 55-83 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol47/iss1/3

2

Witkin: A Time for ChangeL Reevaluating the Constitutional Status of Mino
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF MINORS

tion with respect to children rests on questionable presumptions and an
incoherent philosophical basis.9
Part III then emphasizes the need to reexamine children's rights by
illustrating the dangers created by the Court's current treatment of
children. It suggests that the Court's interpretation of the Constitution
should be guided by two philosophical concepts: human rights theory
and human dignity.1" These interpretive aids show that children's rights
should be coextensive with the rights of adults. Further, the Court
should review cases which implicate children's rights using the same
standards it uses when reviewing adult cases. The use of these philosophical concepts establishes a framework for the legal treatment of
children, and injects uniformity into the Court's jurisprudence of
children's rights.
Of course, simply establishing that children should possess full
constitutional rights as a theoretical matter is unsatisfactory. This Note
acknowledges the dangers of simply abandoning children to their rights
and suggests that possessing rights does not necessitate total independence." It suggests that, until a minor is considered capable of acting
on her own, her guardians and the State owe her an affirmative duty to
assist her in exercising her constitutional rights. 2
II.BACKGROUND
A. The Early Years
Any discussion of children's rights is ironic when one considers the
historic treatment of children. For many centuries, children were seen
as chattels; they were mere property which was created and could be
sold or destroyed by their fathers. 3 This conception may have had its

9. See infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
10. The goal of this Note is twofold. First, it seeks to establish what the rights of children
should be. Second, it proposes a viable legal framework for the analysis of court cases involving
children. It does not assert that the Court's conclusions are without a rational legal basis. Thus,
to use the terminology of Professors Robert Mnookin and John Coons, this Note presents a
theory of justice and approaches an analytical theory. See John E. Coons & Robert H. Mnookin,
Toward a Theory of Children'sRights, in THE CHILD AND THE COURTS 391, 393 (Ian F.G.
Baxter & Mary A. Eberts eds., 1978). This Note does not address the sociological and
psychological impact of the proffered theories on children.
11. See Hafen, supra note 6, at 644-58 (expressing reservations about abandoning children
to their rights and arguing that too much freedom for children can undermine the learning
process and human relationships that sustain them).
12. See id. at 651 (suggesting that parental authority must be regarded as a sovereign right
if the needs of children are to be met).
13. See Barbara B. Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child
as Property,33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 1043 (1992) (stating that the notion of the child as
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origins in the Bible, 4 and was later accentuated in Greek philosophy. 5 These notions pervaded the Roman empire where children "may
have represented the first accumulation of private property."' 6 Thus, it
was not surprising that at English common law, children were seen as
the property of their fathers. 7 In fact, even after death, a father
controlled his children, disposing of them in his will, like any other
piece of property."
In America, children fared little better than their overseas counterparts.' 9 Children's status as mere property meant that there was no legal
recourse for their frequent abuse and mistreatment." One frightening
account of children as property involved the frontier sale of orphaned
and abandoned children.2 These children were periodically loaded into
railroad cars and shipped West where "[t]hose interested in acquiring
these pieces of human property would step up and feel the children to
see how strong, healthy or otherwise attractive they were."22 It was not
until the late nineteenth century that there was a documented case of an
abused child being removed from her parents. Around this time, the

property is at least as old as the Greek and Judeo-Christian traditions identifying man as a
procreative force).
14. See id. at 1044. In suggesting that the notion of child as property has Biblical roots,
Professor Barbara Woodhouse refers to Biblical phrases like "bone of my bones, flesh of my
flesh." Id. at 1044 n.226 (citing Genesis 2:33 (King James)). Another possible example is King
Solomon's statement, "Bring me a sword [so that I can] Divide the living child in two, and give
half to the one, and half to the other." I Kings 3:24-25.
15. Woodhouse, supra note 13, at 1043.
16. Id. at 1044.
17. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *451-53. Among other things, a child
could be forced to work for his or her father's benefit and a child could not marry without his
or her father's consent. Id. at *452-53.
18. See id. at *453.
19. See Woodhouse, supra note 13, at 1045-46 ("[I]n Colonial and even nineteenth-century
America[,] ... [t]he father was entitled to use the child as a productive asset to herd, spin, farm,
or care for younger siblings ... [and] had a right to enforce control over [his] household[ ] by
beatings .... ).
20. See id. at 1046. According to one author, "children [were] ignored and impersonalized." Gill, supra note 4, at 544. Another author noted that children in America were " 'hurt,
degraded, and killed.' " Woodhouse, supra note 13, at 1053 (quoting Helen Campbell, The Child
and the Community, 9 CHAUTAUQUAN 458 (1988-89)).
21. See Gill, supra note 4, at 546.
22. Id.
23. See Jill D. Moore, Comment, Chartinga Course Between Scylla and Charybdis:Child
Abuse Registries and ProceduralDue Process, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2063, 2066 (1995). The Mary
Ellen Wilson story is thought to be one of the first cases of a nonfamilial third party intervening
on behalf of a child. Id. Mary Ellen Wilson was an eight-year-old girl who was chained, starved,
and beaten by her adoptive parents. Id. at 2066-67. The founder of the Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals advocated this little girl's cause, arguing that as a member of the animal
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strict conception of children as property began to wane and the rhetoric
of children's rights was born.24
An early landmark Supreme Court case implicating the interests of
children was Meyer v. Nebraska.25 In Meyer, the issue was whether a
state could forbid the teaching of foreign languages in public schools.26
Although the Court held that the prohibition was unconstitutional, its
decision was not based on children's rights. Instead, the Court noted that
the state law infringed on the liberty interest of parents and teachers; the
law abridged parents' rights to raise their children,27 and the teachers'
rights to engage in an occupation.2" Missing from the Court's main
analysis was any consideration of the children's desires or interest in an
education.

kingdom, she should be free from abuse. Id.
24. See Gill, supra note 4, at 545-46. The first children's rights movement was known as
the "child-saving" movement. Woodhouse, supra note 13, at 1052. In the latter half of the
nineteenth century, mission workers began coming to the aid of immigrant children living in
squalor. Id. As the movement expanded, abused children, still living within the traditional
"family," became targets for the child-savers. See id. To this end, the rhetoric of children's rights
was used as a justification for controlling parental behavior and limiting parental power. Id.
Despite the use of children's rights language, children continued to be regarded by many as
property. See id. at 1054. However, rather than being viewed as parental property, children were
considered property of the community. Id. Specifically, children were seen as" 'essential to the
preservation of the community.' " Id. at 1055 (quoting Hastings H. Hart, The Child-Saving
Movement, 58 BIBLIOTHECCA SARCA 520 (1901)). Perhaps it was, therefore, their value as future
community members rather than any intrinsic value or personhood status which drove the childsaver movement.
25. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
26. Id. at 398-99. The Nebraska state legislature forbade the teaching of any language
other than English to any child who had not successfully passed the eighth grade. Id. at 397. The
state asserted that the prohibition was intended to promote civic development, help children to
acquire American ideals, and promote English as the mother tongue of all Nebraskan children.
Id. at 401. For an in-depth discussion of the political and social significance of Meyer, see
Woodhouse, supra note 13 passim.
27. Meyer, 387 U.S. at 399-400.
28. Id. at 400. The Court recognized that it is within the power of the state to prescribe
a school curriculum. Id. at 402. However, the Court found that "[n]o emergency has arisen
which renders knowledge by a child of some language other than English so clearly harmful as
to justify its inhibition with the consequent infringement of rights long freely enjoyed." Id. at
403.
29. See id. at 400 (discussing only parents' and teachers' interests). The Meyer opinion
only mentions children's rights once, in dicta. Woodhouse, supra note 13, at 1091 (citing Meyer,
262 U.S. at 401).
Meyer may be seen as reaffirming the concept of the child as property. See id. Meyer cut
against the revisionist trend which posited that the child, family, and State formed a triangular
framework of interests. Id. For the Court in Meyer, the status of the child as property was
fundamental and beyond the reach of social reform. See id.
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The Meyer decision illustrates the initial problem with the Court's
jurisprudential approach to cases involving children. Rather than
considering in depth the independent interests of children, or even
viewing the child as part of a triangular relationship between parent,
child, and State, the Meyer Court viewed the controversy as exclusively
between the State and the parents.3" Ironically, it was the children and
teachers, not the parents or the State, who would feel the primary impact
of the Court's decision.3 In a similar case, Pierce v. Society of
Sisters," the issue was whether the State could prescribe public
education for all of its children.33 The Court held the State could not,
because eliminating access to private schools "unreasonably interferes
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control."34 Again, the Court did not
consider the independent views of the children in its analysis.
Although Pierceand Meyer were decided during the formative stages
of the children's rights movement36 (and perhaps this explains the

30. See Woodhouse, supra note 13, at 1091. The Meyer Court found both a parent's
"natural duty ... to give his children education suitable to their station in life" and a teacher's
right to instruct the children. Meyer, 387 U.S. at 400. Further, the Meyer Court found the State
had the power to interfere with these rights if the interference was reasonably related "to some
purpose within the competency of the State to effect." Id.
31. Meyers ended the ban on foreign language studies in 21 states. Ends 21 States' Ban
on Foreign Tongues, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1923, at 1.
32. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
33. Id. at 529-30. The challenged state statute required every parent or guardian of a child
between eight and sixteen years old to send the child to a public school where the child resided.
Id. at 530. Failure to do so was a misdemeanor. Id.
34. Id. at 534-35.
35. See id. at 535 (noting that the right of those who nurtured the child, not the child's
right, was at issue).
36. The early 1900s saw a number of progressive reforms for children, including welfare
bureaus, juvenile courts, and expansion of public schools. Woodhouse, supra note 13, at 1051.
Curiously, in a case decided around the same time as Pierce and Meyer, the Court gave
some recognition to the independent interests of children. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 165 (1944). In Prince, the Court found that the State could enforce child labor laws which
prohibited a child from accompanying her guardian to distribute religious pamphlets at night on
a public street. Id. at 170. While the Prince Court considered the parent's right to raise her
children, it also noted that the child in this case had expressed that she felt it was her duty to
distribute the literature, and that the child had a "right" to exercise religion. Id. at 162-63, 165.
However, the Court foreclosed further analysis in this vein by stating "[t]he state's authority over
children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults." Id. at 168.
Also interesting was the Prince Court's reference to Meyer and Pierce. The Prince Court
noted the child's right to receive religious schooling recognized in Pierce, and the child's right
to receive instruction in foreign languages recognized in Meyer. Id. at 166. However, as
discussed previously, Pierce and Meyer were decided without reference to the interests of the
child, and actually reinforced the conception of the child as property. See supra notes 25-35 and
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Court's approach), the nonrecognition of children's interests continued
even after the Court expressly stated children are constitutional
people. 7 The danger of this approach was highlighted by Justice
Douglas' partial dissent in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 8 In Yoder, the Court
held that Amish children could not be qompelled to attend formal high
school to age sixteen. 9 The Court reasoned that the right of parents to
control their children's education and religious upbringing outweighed
the State's interest in compelling school attendance to age sixteen.' In
his partial dissent, Justice Douglas exposed the weakness in the Court's
analysis. He stated:
It is the future of the student, not the future of the parents,
that is imperiled by today's decision. If a parent keeps his
child out of school beyond the grade school, then the child
will be forever barred from entry into the new and amazing
world of diversity that we have today. The child may
decide that that is the preferred course, or he may rebel. It
is the student's judgement, not his parents', that is essential
if we are to give full meaning to what we have said about
the Bill of Rights and of the right of students to be masters
of their own destiny.4"
These decisions, which view cases affecting children's interests as
conflicts between the parents and the state, implicitly reject the idea that
children have the same rights as adults.42 Despite the Court's acknowlaccompanying text.
37. The United States Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), stated that students are persons under the Constitution while in
school or out of school. Id. at 511.
38. 406 U.S. 205, 244 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
39. Id. at 234.
40. Id. at 233-34. In an aside, the Court discussed the desire of the Amish parents to limit
their children's exposure to non-Amish influences. Id. at 217-19. The Court noted the need of
the Amish children to acquire "Amish attitudes favoring manual work and self-reliance and the
specific skill needed to perform the adult role of an Amish farmer or housewife." Id. at 211.
Presumably, the Court attached some significance to the threat of contemporary influences on
the perpetuance of the Amish community. See id. at 211-12. However, the Court did not
specifically state that parents have a right to preserve communal idiosyncrasies by isolating their
children from other influences.
41. Id. at 245 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
42. A "right" may be characterized as freedom from unjustified intervention into one's
life. See Minow, supra note 5, at 15-16. A court which does not address the independent
interests of children does not justify the impact of its decisions on children's lives. See Yoder,
406 U.S. at 246 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (stating that the Court's decision will greatly
impact an Amish child's life and therefore the child should be given an opportunity to be heard).
Thus, a court that does not include the interests of children in a conflict which will affect the
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edgement that children do have some constitutional rights, some courts
continue to view the independent interests of children as unnecessary for
their decisions.43
B. The Expansionist Era
The Court's decision in In re Gault44 was a highpoint of constitu-

tional jurisprudence for children.45 In Gault, a minor was taken into
custody for allegedly making a lewd phone call to a neighbor. 46 Neither
the minor nor his parents were provided with any factual basis for the
charge. 47 The complainant was never present during the subsequent
delinquency proceedings.4 8 The minor was found to be delinquent and49
was committed to a state-run institution for approximately six years.
The Court held that the potential abridgement of a minor's liberty
mandates that a juvenile court adjudication must comport with the
requirements of due process.5 Accordingly, the Court found that the
minor was entitled to specific advance notice of any charges," to be
represented by counsel and to have notice of this right,52 to confront
and cross-examine his accuser,5 3 and to assert the privilege against selfincrimination. 4

children's future implicitly denies that children have rights. See id. at 244-46 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part).
43. See, e.g., Sampson v. Taylor, 278 N.E.2d 918, 919 (N.Y. 1972) (failing to consider
the child's interest while affirming lower court's judgment that the child was neglected where
the child's parent objected to a medical procedure).
44. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
45. See Michael J. Dale, The Supreme Court and the Minimization of Children's
ConstitutionalRights: Implicationsfor the Juvenile Justice System, 13 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL'Y 199, 205 (1992).
Prior to Gault, the Court decided Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). In Kent, the
Court considered the requirements that a juvenile court must meet before it can validly waive
jurisdiction of a minor and transfer the case to a district court. Id. at 552. The Court found that
the requirements of due process applied to the minor. Id. at 561-62. The Court concluded that
the minor was entitled to both a hearing and counsel prior to waiver, and to access to records
which might be the basis for the waiver. Id.
46. Gault, 387 U.S. at 4.
47. Id. at 5-6.
48. Id. at 5, 7.
49. Id. at 7-8. The applicable penalty for an adult found guilty of the same violation was
a fine of five to fifty dollars, or imprisonment not to exceed two months. Id. at 8-9.
50. Id. at 29-31.
51. Id. at 33.
52. Id. at 41.
53. Id. at 57.
54. Id. at 55. The right to notice and the right to be notified of the right to counsel were
described as joint rights of the parent and the child. Id. at 33-34, 41. This fusion prompted
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Gault marked the peak of the "expansionist era" of children's
rights." Following Gault, the Court developed the scope of children's
substantive and procedural constitutional rights. 6 However, the Court
failed to create a coherent jurisprudential basis for these decisions;57
instead decisions were based on arbitrary line drawing, yielding ad hoc
results."8

Professor Minow to describe these rights as family rights which reinforce the authority of the
parents. Minow, supra note 5, at 19.
55. See Dale, supra note 45, at 205 (describing the Kent and Gault decisions as "the high
point" of the expansionist era).
56. See id. at 206-11.
In one case, the Court held that the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies to a
minor in a delinquency hearing when that minor is charged with an act that would constitute a
crime if committed by an adult. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 258, 368 (1970). In another case, the
Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution prevented a child from being
charged with the same crime as a juvenile and as an adult. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 531
(1975). However, as a practical matter, the scope of this double jeopardy protection was limited.
See Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 219 (1978) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause is
not violated when a juvenile court makes supplemental findings that are substantiated by
evidence to which the parties make no objection).
There are several other notable cases discussing the procedural rights of minors. See, e.g.,
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-%07 (1979) (holding that a minor, involuntarily committed to
a state mental institution, had his liberty interest adequately protected because a "neutral
factfinder" agreed with the parents' decision to commit the minor after conducting a probe of
the minor's background); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977) (holding that students
subject to corporal punishment do not have the right to notice and an adversary proceeding);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S 565, 583 (1975) (holding that a student suspended from school for 10
days has due process rights, but these rights do not include the right to counsel, to confront or
cross-examine his accuser, or to call his own witnesses). Because these decisions concerned
procedural due process rights outside the criminal court setting, the Supreme Court had a
justifiable basis for its holdings. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
However, the Ingraham decision appears suspect because it seems to implicate the children's
substantive right to be free from bodily harm. See Ingraham,430 U.S. at 682. Furthermore, if,
in any of these settings, an adult would be entitled to greater procedural safeguards, the Court
should not be justified in limiting the rights of the minors. See infra text accompanying notes
184-89.
In a more questionable decision, the Court considered the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to the search of a student's purse conducted by a school official. See New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328, 333 (1985). The Court held that the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement was inapplicable and that the search could be conducted with less than probable
cause to suspect wrongdoing. Id. at 340-41. To reach this decision, the Court created a
previously unrecognized exception to the Fourth Amendment procedural search and seizure
requirements. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: REGULATION OF POLICE
INVESTIGATION, LEGAL, HISTORICAL, EMPIRICAL AND COMPARATIVE MATERIALS 290-91 (1993).

57. See David A.J. Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A
JurisprudentialPerspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1980).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

In Gault, the Court held that children facing potential losses of
liberty in the juvenile court system had many of the same procedural
rights adults possessed in the criminal court context. 9 However, in
subsequent cases the Court held that these rights were not coextensive.' In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,6 the Court held that minors' due
process rights did not entitle them to a jury in juvenile delinquency
proceedings.62 In Schall v. Martin,63 the Court upheld a New York
statute authorizing the pretrial detention of minors as not violating the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 The Court
reasoned that although a juvenile has a substantial liberty interest, "that
interest must be qualified by the recognition that juveniles, unlike adults,
are always in some form of custody."65 The Court's reasoning in these
cases serves only to confuse the issue of what procedural rights a minor
should have when faced with a loss of liberty.
The Court has addressed children's substantive rights in a similarly
irrational manner.66 The Court recognized children's First Amendment
right to freedom of speech in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District.67 The Tinker Court held that a school could
not prohibit students from wearing black armbands to protest the
Vietnam War.6" The Court stated, "[i]t can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate."69 However, in Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser," the Court limited this right. The Court
held that a student's election speech which contained sexual innuendo
was not protected by the First Amendment.7 ' The Court's justification,
59. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 41, 57.
60. See Hafen, supra note 6, at 641 (asserting that court decisions deceivingly imply that
the rights of minors are coextensive with those of adults).
61. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
62. Id. at 545.
63. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
64. Id. at 281.
65. Id. at 265 (citing Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs., 458 U.S. 502, 51011 (1982); Gault, 387 U.S. at 17).
66. See Minow, supra note 5, at 4-5 (describing the Court's irrational approach).
67. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
68. Id. at 514.
69. Id. at 506. The Court limited its holding to instances where the speech did not
'materially and substantially interfer[e] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school.' " Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966)) (alteration in original). Of course, even adults may have the time, place, and manner of
their speech regulated if the regulation is content-neutral. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320,
331, 333 (1988).
70. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
71. Id. at 685. As a result of his speech, the student was suspended for two days. Id. at
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' and that school officials
that the speech was not "political speech" 72
were entitled to determine that the speech undermined the school's
educational mission,73 implicitly
limited the scope of children's First
74
Amendment protections.
The Court recognized that children have privacy rights in Planned
Parenthoodv. Danforth. In Danforth, the Court struck down a statute
which required a minor to obtain parental consent to have an abortion.76 In Carey v. Population Services International,7 the Court relied
on minors' privacy rights to invalidate a statute which prohibited the
sale of contraceptives to children under sixteen. 7' Two years later, in
Bellotti v. Baird,79 the Court qualified minors' privacy rights on a
demonstration of maturity."0 The Court held that if a minor could not
demonstrate her maturity, or a judge did not feel that an abortion was
in the best interest of the child, the State could require parental consent
for the abortion. 8 Thus, judges with varying conceptions of maturity
could abridge a child's fundamental right to privacy. 2 Clearly, there is

678-79. The Court also rejected the student's procedural due process claims, holding that the
suspension did not implicate his due process rights. Id. at 686.
72. Id. at 685.
73. Id.
74. The Court did not find that the speech was disruptive. Id. at 678-80. Instead, the Court
relied on its conclusion that the school district was able to determine that the speech was
offensive. Id. at 685. The Court acknowledged that adults could not be prohibited from using
similar language to make a political point. Id. at 682.
Two years after Fraserwas decided, the Court again limited children's free speech rights.
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). In Hazelwood, the Court
upheld a school official's decision to edit the content of a school newspaper. Id. The Court
explained that because the official had a valid educational purpose for his regulation, his actions
were not unconstitutional. Id.
Another notable case limited the First Amendment rights of minors. See Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). There, the Court upheld a state law which prohibited minors from
viewing pornographic material which could be viewed legally by adults. Id. at 636-37.
75. 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
76. Id.
77. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
78. Id. at 693-94.
79. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
80. Id. at 648.
81. Id. The Bellotti decision is also important because it implicitly held that in a conflict
of rights between the parent and the minor, the minor could seek judicial consent. Id. at 648
n.28. This is perhaps the only ground on which the Court has directly dealt with a potential
conflict between the rights of parents and their children. The Court suggested that denying a
minor the right to make such an important decision could result in "grave and indelible"
consequences. Id. at 642.
82. See id. at 648.
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no single coherent principle which guides the Court in determining
either the substantive or procedural rights of minors.8"
Several presumptions and philosophical models which guide the
Court's jurisprudence have emerged from these cases.84 First, and most
important, is the assumption that minors are unable "to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner."8 This view logically leads
the Court to make a cursory inspection of children's need for rights.
Because children are unable to make decisions, someone else will
always have to make decisions for them. 6 Second, the Court assumes
"parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity
for judgement... [and] that parents generally do act in the child's best
interests."87 Further, it is assumed that the State, acting as parens
patriae, will play the proper role of the parent when necessary.88
Together, these assumptions lead the Court to subsume into the family
the independent interests of children. However, these assumptions are
empirically questionable, unmindful of social changes,89 and inconsiderate of children's developmental growth.9"
Moreover, commentators have heavily criticized parens patriae and
in loco parentis,9 the doctrines which the Court uses to justify State
suppression of children's rights.9" To complicate matters further, the

83. See Minow, supra note 5, at 4-5.
84. See Dale, supra note 45, at 221-22 (asserting that 20th century Supreme Court
opinions are based on certain presumptions).
85. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. For a discussion of the assumptions relating to minor's
decisionmaking ability, see Gary B. Melton, Children's Competence to Consent: A Problem in
Law and Social Science, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 1, 1-16 (Gary B. Melton et
al. eds., 1983).
86. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 244 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part) (criticizing the majority opinion for not considering the interests of the child).
87. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979).
88. See id. at 603 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944)). See generally Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the
Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. REV. 205 (1971) (discussing the State's parens patriae power).
89. See Lupu, supra note 2, at 1323-25 (explaining social changes which have taken place
in the past centuries).
90. See generally Gerald P. Koocher, Children under Law: The Paradigm of Consent, in
REFORMING THE LAW 9, 23-25 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1987) (explaining the stages of child
development).
91. For a discussion and historical development of these doctrines, see Joan L. Neisser,
School Officials: Parentsor Protectors?The Contributionof a Feminist Perspective, 39 WAYNE
L. REV. 1507 (1993).
92. See, e.g., Dale, supra note 45, at 200; Rendleman, supra note 88, at 205. The doctrine
of parens patriae assumes that the state will act on the best interest of the child when a parent
is unfit. Id. at 218-19. Many scholars have expounded the difficulties in applying the "best
interest" standard. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the
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Court uses children's rights rhetoric to refer to many things besides the
independent interests of children.93 Thus, the Court's decisions in cases
involving the interests of children, have been confusing at the least.94
Often, it is unclear whether the Court will consider the independent
interest of children at all. If a case seems to implicate the rights of
children it is difficult to predict when the Court will recognize, expand,
or limit those rights.95 Finally, because the Court operates on questionable presumptions and outdated doctrines, it is time to reexamine the
Court's reasoning and conclusions in those cases implicating the rights
of children.
III. THE CRIsIS
Outside the narrow confines of previous Court decisions, there are
no clear guidelines for determining what rights, or partial rights,
children possess. Without a clear set of rights there can be no complementary set of duties.96 The resultant ambiguity leaves children with no
one, or without the knowledge of whom to turn to, in their times of
need.9
This uncertainty presents a serious threat to the well-being of
children.98 This threat materialized in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services.99 Joshua DeShaney was a minor child
Child, 54 U. CH. L. REv. 1, 11-28 (1987); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication:
Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 255-62

(1975).
The in loco parentis doctrine which the Court continues to apply, is based on the patriarchal
model of the family which is supposed to be a thing of the past. Neisser, supra note 91, at 150910.
93. See Hafen, supra note 6, at 642 (criticizing the use of children's rights terminology);
Minow, supra note 5, at 18-21 (exploring various conceptions of children's rights); Woodhouse,
supra note 13, at 1051-68 (examining the "language" of children's rights).
94. Some standards may be extracted from these decisions. "Parents have a right to control
of their children, and the state can limit such control only upon demonstrating a compelling
interest. Absent such an interest, the state must enforce parental control.... [However,] a minor
who can prove her maturity has the sole right to make [abortion] decisions." Leslie A. Fithian,
Note, ForcibleRepatriationof Minors: The Competing Rights of Parent and Child, 37 STAN.

L. REv. 187, 208 (1984). These standards do not encompass the range of children's rights issues
and are subject to frequent change.
95. See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (expanding children's First Amendment Rights);
Fraser,478 U.S. at 685 (limiting a student's First Amendment rights).
96. See JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 139-40 (1964)
(explaining Hohfeld's theory for every right, there is a corresponding duty).
97. See Gill, supra note 4, at 553 (advocating the granting of assertible rights to the childcitizen in order to solve juvenile problems).
98. See id.

99. 489 U.S. 189 (1989); see Gill, supra note 4, at 562 (explaining DeShaney and
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living in the custody of his father in Winnebago County."°° County
social services became involved with Joshua after an examining
physician notified them of suspected child abuse.' Joshua was
removed temporarily from his father's custody, but was returned after
his father agreed to comply with a plan establishing abuse prevention
measures."° During the next six months, county social services made
periodic visits to see Joshua.

3

Joshua's caseworker noted that the

child often had suspicious injuries and that Joshua's father had not
complied with the prevention agreement." 4 During the same period,
the hospital emergency room twice notified social services that Joshua
had been treated for suspicious injuries.' 5 Nevertheless, social services
took no further action on Joshua's case."° Finally, Joshua received
such a severe beating from his father that he fell into a coma. 7 While
Joshua survived the beating, he emerged from emergency surgery
profoundly retarded and was expected to spend the remainder of his life
in an institution. 8
Joshua and his mother brought suit, claiming that Winnebago County
had deprived Joshua of his liberty without due process."' The Court's
analysis focused on the substantive requirements of the Due Process
Clause."0 Curiously, the Court made no effort to distinguish between
the due process rights of an adult and those of a minor."' The Court
stated "the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life,
liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not
deprive the individual.""' 2 Reviewing its prior decisions, the Court
concluded that such an affirmative duty could arise, but only when the
State takes a person into custody and holds him there against his

asserting the need for clear rights of children).
100. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191.
101. Id. at 192.
102. Id. The protective measures included enrolling Joshua in a preschool program,
providing the father with counselling, and encouraging the father's girlfriend to move out of the
home. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 192-93.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 193.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 194-95.
111. See id. at 194-97.
112. Id. at 196.
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will."' The Court reasoned that because the harms to Joshua occurred
while he was in the custody of his father, the State had no affirmative
duty to protect Joshua."4
Joshua's DeShaney's tragic life is not an isolated incident. During
the 1980s there were 2.4 million reports of child maltreatment. 5 If
nothing else, this statistic suggests that the assumptions underlying the
Supreme Court's jurisprudential approach to children's rights have
weakened." 6 Children like Joshua need clearly defined avenues of
protection."'
The need for a new approach to children's rights springs from more
than just the child abuse context. The country's dissatisfaction with the
juvenile justice system stems largely from a lack of clarity about the

113. Id. at 199-200. The Court stated:
The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the State by the affirmative
exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable
to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human
needs--e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety-it
transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and
the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 200.
114. Id. at 201. Noting that the county's voluntary intervention might raise a duty in some
contexts, the Court suggested that Joshua look to state tort law for a remedy. Id. at 201-02.
However, by establishing a state agency with authority to act on Joshua's behalf, a reliance
interest was created. See Kristen L. Davenport, Due Process-Claimsof Abused Children
Against State Protective Agencies-The State's Responsibility After DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 243, 247-48 (1991).
For a detailed review of court cases since DeShaney that address the issue of when states
have an affirmative duty to aid a minor, see Karen M. Blum, DeShaney: Custody, Creation of
Danger,and Culpability, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 435 (1994).
115. Gill, supra note 4, at 555 (citing CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CRITICAL FIRST STEPS
IN RESPONSE TO A NATIONAL EMERGENCY x (Aug. 1990)).
116. See id. at 547, 561-62 (criticizing the "best interests of the child" standard and
asserting that "the child, whose interests were supposedly being considered [had] already been
thrown in the stream and is now probably dead"). This is not to suggest that the majority of
parents do not act in the best interest of their children. See Richards, supra note 57, at 36
("[Tihere is good reason... to presume that natural parents are most suited to custody and
control .... "). Undoubtedly, parents should retain the primary responsibility for the care and
upbringing of their children. See Hafen, supra note 6, at 656-58 (advocating parental control).
However, cases like DeShaney make it clear that the Court's analytical approach to children's
constitutional rights needs to be reconsidered. See Gill, supra note 4, at 559 (exposing the
desperate situation children find themselves in because of biological bias and using Joshua
DeShaney as an example).
117. See Gill, supra note 4, at 562 (explaining DeShaney and asserting the need for clear
rights of children).
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proper role for the State." 8 Traditionally, the State has occupied a
parens patriae role." 9 The differences between the juvenile court and
adult court were justified by the claim that the system was not seeking
to punish minors for their transgressions." 2 Instead, the juvenile court
system was to prescribe rehabilitation for minors, helping them to once
again become productive members of society. 2 '
However, since the advent of the juvenile justice system in the early
twentieth century, society and juveniles have become increasingly
violent.' Not surprisingly, the juvenile justice system has changed as
well.'23 While children still are denied the full procedural due process
rights enjoyed by adults, the disposition of their cases has become less
paternalistic. 24 Professor Dale suggests that the Court has switched
from a rehabilitative to a retributive parens patriae approach.'25 Of
course, such a change in approach cannot be reconciled with the original
underpinnings of the juvenile justice system. 6 Professor Dale states:
Children receive neither full due process protections nor
rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system. The Supreme
Court's decisions over the past twenty years demonstrate
this fact, evidencing a punitive attitude toward children on
118. See Rosemary S. Sackett, Terminating ParentalRights of the Handicapped,25 FAM.
L.Q. 253, 269-70 (1991).
119. Rendleman, supra note 88, at 205.
120. See Early Juvenile Court, supra note 2, at 988-91. Initially, it was believed that the
formalities of the adult court system would interfere with the goal of juvenile rehabilitation. Id.
at 989-90. The ideal of the juvenile court system was poignantly characterized by a judge
writing in the early twentieth century:
The ordinary trappings of the courtroom are out df place in [juvenile] hearings. The
judge on a bench, looking down upon the boy standing at the bar, can never evoke
a proper sympathetic spirit. Seated at a desk, with the child at his side, where he
can on occasion put his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad to him, the
judge, while losing none of his judicial dignity, will gain immensely in the
effectiveness of his work.
Id. at 990 (quoting Judge Julian Mack).
121. Id. at 990-91.
122. Gill, supra note 4, at 548. The first special legal institution for adjudicating criminal
charges against children was offered in 1899. Minow, supra note 5, at 21. For a statistical look
at the increase in juvenile crime, see Kathryn J. Parsley, Note, Constitutional Limitations on
State Power to Hold ParentsCriminally Liable for the Delinquent Acts of Their Children, 44
VAND. L. REV. 441, 444 (1991) (citing to F.B.I. and Justice Department reports).
123. See Dale, supra note 45, at 223-24.
124. See id. at 224-25.
125. Id. at 208-12.
126. See id. at 227.
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the one hand while believing in their increased sophistication and responsibility for their negative behavior on the
other. These decisions, coupled with the public perception
about children, have produced a juvenile justice system
which continues to provide children with inadequate due
process protections while at the same time eschewing
rehabilitation in favor of a mini-adult prison system.'
The unfairness of such a double-edged system calls for redefining the
Court's approach to children's rights."
The child custody context presents a further impetus for redefining
our current approach to children's rights." 9 Child custody issues
predominantly arise in two settings-custody disputes in the course of
marriage dissolution, and actions for the termination of parental
rights. 3 The applicable standard in these cases is "the best interests
of the child." '' However, without a clear definition of a child's rights,
this standard is of little help to the courts.' As an abstract concept,
the best interests of the child standard implicates too many factors and
competing viewpoints to assure that it is the child's best interest which
is preserved.' Articulating a child's rights will provide the courts
with a baseline from which to apply the standard. 3 By asking the
question, does this disposition preserve the rights of the child, courts
will have a method for determining the best interests of the child.'35
127. Id.
128. Id. at 224-28.
129. Minow, supra note 5, at 23.
130. Guidelinesfor Child Custody Evaluations in Divorce Proceedings, FAIR$HARE, Apr.
1995, at 30.
131. Tari Eitzen, A Child's Right to Independent Legal Representation in a Custody
Dispute: A Unique Legal Situation, a Necessarily Broad Standard, the Child's Constitutional
Rights, the Role of the Attorney Whose Client Is the Child, 19 FAM. L.Q. 53, 54-55 (1985);
Mnookin, supra note 92, at 236. A majority of the states provide by statute for the "best interest
of the child" standard. Id. In addition to divorce and neglect proceedings, this standard is utilized
in guardianship proceedings in probate courts. Id. at 237.
132. See Eitzen, supra note 131, at 54-56.
133. Id. at 55-56. The principle is indeterminate, "in many cases, perhaps most, it simply
does not yield a decision .... when the principle is determinate, it is liable to yield unjust
decisions .... [and] the principle is self-defeating... [it] is likely to impose 'process costs'
that on balance tend to make children worse off." Elster, supra note 92, at 11-12.
134. See Eitzen, supra note 131, at 64 (advocating that courts recognize children's rights
when deciding custody disputes).
135. See id.; see also Jerri A. Blair, Gregory K. and Emerging Children'sRights, TRIAL,
June 1993, at 22, 22-25, where the author provides an encouraging result for a minor involved
in a custody dispute. Gregory K., an 1I-year-old boy, filed a petition with the state of Florida,
seeking to terminate his relationship with parents. Id. at 22. By the time his suit came to trial,
Gregory had been in foster care for more than 32 months, and had not heard from either parent
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The need for a clear definition of children's rights has spawned
international efforts to provide such a guide.'3 6 In England, under the
1969 Children and Young Persons Act, a minor is a party to child-care
proceedings and is therefore entitled to independent legal representation. 3 7 Ironically, it is parents who are not parties to the action and
therefore are not entitled to legal representation.'3 8 The General
Assembly of the Council of Europe has adopted a recommendation
which states: "[t]he notion of parental responsibility should be substituted for that of parental authority, and the rights of the child as a distinct
member of the family should be defined."' 39 In 1989, the United
Nations (U.N.) unanimously adopted the U.N. Convention on the Rights
of the Child."4 The Convention provides an exhaustive list of
children's rights and the complementary duties of the State and
parents. 41 While more than seventy nations have ratified the Convention,'4 2 the United States has not.'4 3
IV. ESTABLISHING THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
The Supreme Court's jurisprudential approach to children's rights is
largely a product of our common law heritage of recognizing parental
rights.' However, just as other countries have responded to the need for

in more than 18 months. Id. The trial court held that Gregory had standing to file the termination
of parental rights petition. Id. at 25. The court relied on the language of the Florida and United
States Constitutions in arriving at this decision. Id. Specifically, the court relied on a Florida
Supreme Court decision which held "Minors are natural persons in the eyes of the law and
'[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come in to being magically only when one attains the
state defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults ... possess constitutional rights.' " Id.
(citing In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989)) (alterations in original). Through
Gregory's persistence, the termination was granted. Id. at 22. The article's author, Jerri Blair,
represented Gregory in his suit. Id.
136. See Gill, supra note 4, at 566 n.82 (stating that at least 79 national constitutions
contain provisions explicitly addressing the rights of children).
137. Henri Giller & Susan Maidment, Representation of Children: Does More Mean
Better?, in THE RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT 405, 409 (John M. Eekelaar & Sanford N.

Katz eds., 1984).
138. Id.
139. Madzy Rood-de Boer, Decision Making About Health Care and Medical Treatment
of Minors, in THE RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT, supra note 137, at 557, 559-60.
140. Gill, supra note 4, at 574.
141. Id. at 574-79.
142. Id. at 578.
143. GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES TREATIES IN FORCE: CURRENT TREATY ACTION
SUPPLEMENT 91 (Igor I. Kaurass ed., 1995).
144. See Dale, supra note 45, at 222; see also Gill, supra note 4, at 548-49 (describing the
Supreme Court's jurisprudential approach); Hafen, supra note 6, at 615-19 (describing the
common law tradition of recognizing parental rights).
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a new approach to the rights of children, our couritry can shed the
antiquated assumptions which have guided the Court's jurisprudence. 45
Moreover, several legal bases exist for concluding that children are
to enjoy the rights guaranteed to adults under our Constituentitled
146
tion.
A. The IndividualistTradition
The constitutional protections which are commonly termed "rights"
are located primarily in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.1 47 These amendments give rights to "the people, ' 148 but do not
define who "the people" are. Specifically, the Constitution does not
expressly address the question of whether "the people" includes or
excludes children. The constitutional significance of childhood is a
product of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution. 49
Therefore, to analyze the Court's treatment of children, it is important
to reflect on the values and motivations of the framers who drafted the
Constitution. 5

145. See Dale, supra note 45, at 228 (asserting that the Supreme Court must recognize that
children are entitled to both expanded constitutional rights and rehabilitation).
146. See infra text accompanying notes 147-85.
147. Richards, supra note 57, at 7; see U.S. CONST. amends. I-X, XIV.
148. For example, the Fourth Amendment states in part, "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
149. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)
(affirming that minors are "persons" under the Constitution). Defining the boundaries of
childhood is an arbitrary process. See Minow, supra note 5, at 3-4. The arbitrary line-drawing
which defines childhood is a product of necessity. But see Hafen, supra note 6, at 512-13
(positing that the line between childhood and adulthood is based on long-standing presumptions
about lack of capacity to make certain decisions prior to attaining a certain age). The need for
certain and uniform societal guidelines and laws mandates this action. However, because
childhood has become a basis for divesting a young person of constitutional rights which adults
have, we must question whether childhood continues to be a protective measure for children. See
Richards, supra note 57, at 6.
Unless parents or the state consistently and voluntarily zealously protect the interest of
children, the protections of childhood are a facade. Unfortunately, in our society many children
are without such protectors. This suggests that an arbitrary definition of childhood is
unacceptable. However individual inquiries into the capacities of a young person are a practical
impossibility. Thus, the'logical alternative is to reevaluate the constitutional import of childhood.
150. Richards, supra note 57, at 4. There has been controversy over the scope of the
Constitution's protection of individual rights. Id. An originalist inquiry might well reflect that
because minors did not have any legal status when the Constitution was written, Hafen, supra
note 6, at 605, and therefore conclude that constitutional rights were not intended to apply to
children. See generallyLee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2679-81 (1992) (Scalia J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Establishment Clause was not intended to prohibit a prayer at a high school
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The individualist tradition had a heavy influence on the Framers of
our Constitution.151 The idea that sound political theory must be based
on a person's individual nature was born during the European Enlightenment. " ' The thrust of this belief was to regard individuals, rather than
the State, as the focal point of organized society. 53 For obvious
reasons, this philosophy held great appeal for American colonists
struggling for independence." Encouraged by their successful break
from English rule, the Framers sought to enshrine these tenets of
individualism within our Constitution. Thus, the Constitution, and
particularly, the Bill of Rights, may be viewed as an express acknowledgement of the primacy of the individual and, concomitantly, affirmative protection for the "human rights" which lie at the heart of individualism.'55 A logical expansion of this is to view the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights as being written in part to provide formal protection
to the primacy of the individual by safeguarding the "human rights"
possessed by all people.
To understand the scope of the protections provided by the Constitution, we also must explore the "human rights theory."'56 Central to this
theory is the idea of autonomy: human beings, unlike other animals, are
able to evaluate choices, make decisions, and structure their lives in
accordance with those decisions.'57 People seeking similar ends often
graduation ceremony because the framers and others engaged in similar practices subsequent to
the ratification of the First and Fourteenth Amendments). However, other theories of
constitutional interpretation would apply the framers' values and ideas by adapting them to
contemporary conditions. As Benjamin Cardozo stated:
There shall be symmetrical development, consistent[] with history or custom when
history or custom has been the motive force.... [blut symmetrical development
may be bought at too high a price. Uniformity ceases to be a good when it
becomes uniformity of oppression. The social interest served by symmetry or
certainty must then be balanced against the social interest served by equity and
fairness or other elements of social welfare. These may enjoin upon the judge the
duty of drawing the line at another angle, of staking the path along new courses.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-13 (1921). Considering

our dramatic societal changes, see supra text accompanying notes 1-2, and the vulnerable
position of children, this Note presumes that a more liberal interpretive theory is necessary to
protect our children. See Richards, supra note 57, at 20 ("The human infant is born the most
vulnerable of the primates.").
151. Hafen, supra note 6, at 610.
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. Richards, supra note 57, at 8.
157. Id. In turn, it is these individual decisions which define "who" people are or at least
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make different choices to reach their goals. It is this freedom of choice
or "autonomy" which human rights theory holds as the primary
imperative of organized society.'58 Thus, the Constitution and Bill of
Rights should be read to entitle every person to equal respect in their
pursuit of autonomy.'59
Of course, some people are incapable of autonomous decisionmaking.
A person who becomes infirm may no longer be able to rationally
evaluate choices and make decisions.)" It would be illogical to protect
the autonomy of one who cannot be autonomous." This reasoning has
been used by scholars to expressly exclude children from the ambit of
human rights theory and, consequently, from constitutional
protections62
Similar reasoning was used to exclude other classes of people, such
as women and blacks, from human rights theory. 63 It was argued that
neither women nor blacks were autonomous." However, "the idea of
human rights does not require actual autonomy, but only the capacity for
it."' 65 Hence, the Constitution protects both the right of people to act
as autonomous individuals and to become autonomous indiViduals.'6
Children, like the aforementioned classes, have the capacity to
become autonomous individuals. 67 As people with the capacity for
autonomy, children also should receive constitutional protections. The
Court's interpretation of the word "person" in the Constitution implicitly

how they are perceived.
158. Id. at 8-11.
159. See id. at 8. Professor Richards explains: "[t]he human rights theory that underlies the
Constitution involves, first, the belief that every person has a capacity for autonomy, and,
second, the principle that every person has the right to equal concern and respect in his pursuit
of autonomy." Id.
160. I would distinguish between adults who lose their rational decisionmaking ability and
children who have yet to attained this ability. In the former class of people, it is impossible to
say whether they will ever again be able to live as autonomous individuals. In the latter, it
should be assumed that children are continually developing the ability to make responsible
decision and concomitantly, the ability to live autonomously.
161. See Richards, supra note 57, at 10 ("[t]he idea of human rights does not require actual
autonomy, but only the capacity for it.").
162. Hafen, supra note 6, at 611-12.
163. See id. at 610-11.
164. See Richards, supra note 57, at 10.
165. Id. In fact, making independent choices is an important part of the developmental
process. Gary B. Melton, Decision Making by Children: PsychologicalRisks and Benefits, in
CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT, supra note 85, at 24-34. The opportunity to participate
in decision about one's own life, even when one is "uninformed" is critical to psychological and
social development. Id. at 24.
166. Richards, supra note 57, at 8.
167. Melton, supra note 165, at 24.
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recognizes this point. The Court has expressly stated that minors are to
be included in the constitutional concept of person. 6 For example in
In re Gault, the Court stated "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone.', 169 And in Tinker, the Court said
"[s]tudents in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our
Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State
must respect."' 7 ° As constitutional people, children should be entitled
to constitutional protections equivalent to those given other classes of
constitutional people.
B. Human Dignity
This interpretation of the Constitution is supported by a second
philosophical underpinning, the concept of "human dignity."'' The
protection of human dignity pervaded the thinking of the framers who
drafted the Constitution." The human dignity concept begins with the
assumption that the need for self-respect lies at the base of all human
motivations.'
Therefore, the rules created by an organized society
should be interpreted to protect and acknowledge the primacy of this
motivation. 74 The Constitution, as the "master" set of societal rules,
should be interpreted to protect each individual's dignity, which
provides the basis for self-respect.' The Supreme Court often has
expressly recognized and applied the human dignity concept when
interpreting the Constitution. 176 At times, the Court expressly has used

168. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. Because the Constitution makes no mention of children, see
supra text accompanying notes 148-49, the Court could have easily justified any and all
differences between the constitutional right of adults and those of minors by simply leaving
children out of the constitutional "person." However, recognizing that the term person includes
children, the Court must justify every distinction between the rights of adults and minors.
169. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
170. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
171. Charles R. Tremper, Respect for the Human Dignity of Minors: What the Constitution
Requires, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1293, 1301 (1988). Some scholars have argued that human
dignity is a component of human rights theory. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 57, at 11.
Professor David Richards asserts that when a person is denied equal respect for their autonomous
decisions or their capacity for autonomy, it is an affront to their human dignity. Id. Equal respect
is denied when the rights of one constitutional person to make autonomous decisions or become
autonomous are less than the rights of another constitutional person. Id. at 16. For Professor
Richards, the concept of human dignity seemingly is shorthand for a guarantee of autonomy.
172. See Tremper, supra note 171, at 1301.
173. Id. at 1313 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 440 (1971)).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1301-08.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol47/iss1/3

22

Witkin: A Time for ChangeL Reevaluating the Constitutional Status of Mino
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF MINORS

the human dignity concept while interpreting the First, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments." 7
While human dignity is at first glance an ambiguous concept,
Professor Charles Robert Tremper has illuminated the importance of
human dignity as a constitutional guide. 7 He states that among the
most important tenets of human dignity are "the primacy of control over
personal destiny, the inherent value of each person, and the equal worth
of all individuals, each of which must receive supreme regard."' 79
Further, like human rights theory, the concept of human dignity applies
to children as well as adults. 8 Children who, throughout their
minority, must follow the absolute dictates of adults despite personal
curiosities or objections, are unlikely to develop self-motivation or selfrespect.'
It follows that the Constitution should guarantee that
children play a significant role in those processes which will affect their
autonomy, their person (who they are) and their futures. 82 Essentially,
human dignity mandates that the Constitution provide equal protection
for the autonomy and capacity for autonomy of all children that it
provides for adults.'83
Together, the human rights theory and the human dignity concept
stand for the proposition that the Constitution embodies the fundamental
guarantees necessary to protect the autonomy and development of
autonomy of all people.'84 These interpretive aids support the Court's
inclusion of children within the constitutional concept of person.'

177. Id. at 1308. The Court has implicitly or tacitly relied on human dignity in an
extremely broad range of interpretive settings. Id. at 1308-11 (citing to cases which involved
such things as Nazi abominations and residual rights of prisoners).
178. See generally id. at 1308-14 (discussing the Supreme Court's recognition of human
dignity).
179. Id. at 1303.
180. Id. at 1311-12.
181. Melton, supra note 165, at 30-32.
182. Tremper, supra note 171, at 1312-14. The Constitution might be seen as guaranteeing
that adults will "have a voice" in processes which affect their person and/or property. This
guarantee should apply to children as well.
183. Id. at 1312-20. Protecting dignity does not mean allowing incompetents or minors to
make any decision regardless of the consequences. Id. at 1314. It must be recognized that some
uninformed decisions actually will decrease future autonomy. Hafen, supra note 6, at 650.
Decisions of this nature should be guided and supervised by a party charged with the care of the
child. Id.
184. See Richards, supra note 57, at 8 (asserting that the human rights theory that underlies
the Constitution involves the belief that every person has a capacity for autonomy and every
person has the right to equal respect for his or her pursuit of autonomy); Tremper, supra note
171, at 1314 (asserting that the Constitution compels respect for minors' dignity).
185. See Richards, supra note 57, at 8 (human rights theory); Tremper, supra note 171, at
1314 (human dignity concept).
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Therefore, as a baseline, children should have constitutional rights
equivalent to those granted other constitutional people. This is not to say
that the Court must ignore the differences between children and adults.
The Court could explain different treatment of a child and an adult by
explaining why it is justifiable to infringe on the child's rights.'86
However, the Court has interpreted the Constitution to provide children
with fewer substantive and procedural rights than adults."8 7 Neither
human dignity nor human rights theory lend support to these results.'88
Thus, we must question the rationale of the Court in reaching such
disparate results.'89
C. The Court's Rationale
Differences in the procedural rights of children and adults are most
notable in the juvenile court context."9 Although Gault recognized that
children possess some of the procedural due process rights possessed by
adults, 91 subsequent decisions have curtailed complete parity." As
noted previously, the Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania'93 held that
children in a juvenile court proceeding are not entitled to trial by
jury.

194

McKeiver involved a class of juveniles tried in juvenile courts on
charges of juvenile delinquency.' 95 The juveniles were charged with,
and found to have committed, various violations of the adult criminal
code as a predicate for the juvenile delinquency charges.'96 The issue
on appeal was whether these juveniles were entitled to a jury trial in the
delinquency proceeding.'97 The Court, relying on Gault, held that the

186. This approach would have several significant advantages over the Court's current
jurisprudence. See infra text accompanying notes 224-25 discussing the implications of this
approach.
187. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (holding that children
do not have a right to be heard by a jury in juvenile courts).
188. Richards, supra note 57, at 39-61 (human rights theory); Tremper, supra note 171, at
1331-36 (human dignity concept).
189. See Richards, supra note 57, at 3; Tremper, supra note 171, at 1296.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 59-65.
191. Gault, 387 U.S. at 29-57; supra text accompanying notes 44-54.
192. See supra note 56 for a summary of Supreme Court cases defining children's due
process rights.
193. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
194. Id. at 545. The Sixth Amendment provides in relative part, "[iun all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
195. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 534-38.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 530.
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juveniles' due process rights were implicated,'98 but found that
"fundamental fairness""' did not mandate a jury trial.' 0 The Court
listed a number of reasons for rejecting the juveniles' appeal,.2 '
including the following reason:
[The juveniles' arguments are] the identical arguments that
underlie the demand for the jury trial for criminal proceedings. The arguments necessarily equate the juvenile proceeding-or at least the adjudicative phase of it-with the
criminal trial.... Concern about... rules of evidence...
[and other factors]-all to the effect that this will create the
likelihood of pre-judgment--chooses to ignore.., every
.aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal
attention that the juvenile court system contemplates.2
Although the Court claimed that its holding did not rest solely on the
conceptual differences between adult criminal court and juvenile court
proceedings,0 3 its reasoning belied its claim. The Court seemed to be
saying that an accurate adjudication of guilt is less crucial for a minor
than an adult because the minor's punishment would not be comparable
to an adult's.' However, as the Gault Court recognized, whatever the
disposition in a juvenile proceeding, the minor's liberty is likely to be
abridged.0 5 It is this potential deprivation of liberty that triggers the
minor's due process rights. 2' The Supreme Court has held that a jury
trial is essential to safeguard an adult's potential loss of liberty.0 7
Therefore, the McKeiver Court's reliance on the differences between

198. Id. at 541.
199. Id. at 543. The Court drew on prior decisions, namely Gault and Winship, to hold that
the applicable standard of review was fundamental fairness. Id. at 543. Although this disparate
standard is ostensibly justified by the differences in the adult and juvenile court settings, one
might question the validity of the distinction given the Court's dicta concerning the efficacy of
the juvenile court system. See id. at 543-45 (discussing the failings and successes of the juvenile

court system).
200. Id. at 545.
201. Id. at 545-50.
202. Id. at 550.
203. Id. at 541. This distinction would, as the Court acknowledged, be an artificial one. Id.
204. Although Justice Blackmun, who announced the opinion of the plurality, did not
specifically state that consequences in juvenile proceedings were less severe than those in adult
proceedings, Justice White's concurrence noted this. See id. at 553 (White, J., concurring)
("[Tihe consequences of adjudication are less -severe than those flowing from verdicts of
criminal guilt.").
205. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 27-28.
206. Id.
207. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
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adult and juvenile court does not justify fewer procedural safeguards for
minors.'°s
Moreover, the McKeiver Court's reasoning is inconsonant with the
interpretive theories the Court should have applied. In accord with
human rights theory and human dignity, procedural rights, which
preceed the potential deprivation of one's liberty, exist to safeguard
one's autonomy and self-respect." ° The fact that our society desires
different sanctions for juvenile and adult offenders is inapposite. An
inaccurate adjudication of guilt, regardless of the consequences, will
invariably lead to a loss of autonomy for the minor and will assuredly
impair a minor's self-respect. 1 Accordingly, if a jury trial is a
necessary safeguard for the autonomy and dignity of an adult, a juvenile
should be entitled to one as well."'
208. Furthermore, these differences have, in many cases, proved illusory. See Gault, 387
U.S. at 21-25; Dale, supra note 45, at 223-24.
209. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,620-21 (1979) (describing adequate procedures
used before extinguishing the liberty rights of mentally ill children).
210. Justice Douglas dissented in McKeiver, stating,
where a State uses its juvenile court proceedings to prosecute a juvenile for a
criminal act and to order "confinement" until the child reaches 21 years of age or
where the child at the threshold of the proceedings faces that prospect, then he is
entitled to the same procedural protection as an adult.
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas also explained that the true
trauma of being incarcerated without due process is the feeling of being deprived of basic rights.
Id. at 562 (citing Judge De Ciantis' unpublished opinion in In the Matter of McCloud, decided
January 15, 1971 (Fain. Ct. R.I.)).
211. See id. at 558-60 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The McKeiver Court stated that "[i]f the
formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court
system, there is little need for its separate existence." Id. at 551. I believe the Court
overestimates the burden of equivalent procedural safeguards on the juvenile court system. First,
it cannot be presumed that all juveniles would want jury trials and similar rights. Id. at app. 564
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Some states permit jury trials in all juvenile court cases; few juries
have been demanded."). For minor offenders, guilty of the charged offense, the prospect of
becoming embroiled in a full-blown adversarial procedure is likely to be unappealing. The
majority of these juveniles are probably going to want to get in and out of the system as quickly
and painlessly as possible. Similarly, even some of the innocent minor offenders are likely to
take their chances with a less involved proceeding if it means a speedy disposition. However,
for those innocent accused who choose otherwise and for serious offenders facing significant
consequences, a jury trial is an important safeguard to accurate factfinding. Id. at app. 565
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, the role of the juvenile court judge still would be valuable in the dispositional
phase of the proceeding. Id. at app. 568 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The special understanding and
insight which characterize the ideal juvenile court judge can still be applied after a minor has
been adjudicated guilty by an impartial jury. Id. at app. 568-69 (Douglas, J., dissenting). If
rehabilitation remains the goal of our juvenile justice system, there is no reason that granting
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The reasoning used by the McKeiver Court is typical of the reasoning
used by the Court in other cases where minors are denied full procedural
rights, equivalent to those granted adults.212 Regardless of the justification, limiting the procedural rights of minors is not consonant with the
interpretive theories previously discussed. Procedural rights should be
coextensive with those given adults.
While limiting the procedural rights of minors is clearly unjustifiable,
the arguments for limiting substantive rights are considerably more
forceful. The arguments may be divided into two categories. First,
minors, because of their limited wisdom and decisionmaking abilities,
must be protected from the folly of their youth.213 Second, there are
times when the substantive rights of children will conflict with, and be
subordinated to, the interests and rights of their parents or the state.214
The first of these arguments has been articulated by Professor Bruce
Hafen. Professor Hafen has termed substantive rights "rights of
'
choice."215
Rights of choice entitle a person to make affirmative
decisions which have binding consequences." 6 To use the terminology
of human rights theory and the concept of human dignity, these are the
rights which allow a person to live as an autonomous individual.217
Professor Hafen explains that "a basic capacity to make responsible
choices is a prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of choice
rights."2 ' He concludes that because minors may be presumed, in the

children procedural rights which safeguard the truth will impair this goal. Id. at app. 566
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
212. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 332-33, 340 (1985) (holding that
searches of students in school need not comport with strict Fourth Amendment requirements
because of the special needs of the school environment); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265,
281 (1984) (noting that pretrial detention of minors is permissible because they are always in
some form of custody).
213. See, e.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 406 (1981) (basing its holding on the
perceived immaturity of children). But see Dale, supra note 45, at 204 (asserting that the Court's
belief that children need guidance and are too immature to make important decisions changed
during the 1960s and 1970s).
214. See Minow, supra note 5, at 13 ("[S]tate and parental interests in controlling and
guiding children counter or constrict notions of individual rights for children."); see also
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-16 (1972) (concluding that a parents' right to determine
the education of their children in accordance with religious values was greater than the state or
children's interest in attending school).
215. Hafen, supra note 6, at 644, 650.
216. Id. at 644 (referring to rights such as the right to marry, vote, exercise religious
preferences, and choose whether to seek education).
217. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
218. Hafen, supra note 6, at 647. Professor Hafen goes on to explain why he believes that
the promise of the individual tradition can only be fulfilled by subjugating the choice rights of
minors to those of their parents. Id. at 647-58.
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eyes of the law, to lack the capacity to make decisions, the limitations
on the substantive rights of minors are justified." 9

While the presumption upon which this conclusion rests may be true
in some cases," it should not be given constitutional significance. The
Constitution should be interpreted so that substantive rights protect both
the autonomy of adults and the capacity for autonomy possessed by
minors.21 Denying minors the right to make choices means that, to a
large extent, their futures will be determined by the decisions of others.
Children should, to the greatest extent possible, be free to chart their
own paths through life. 22 The substantive rights in the Constitution are
intended to ensure freedom to do this.
Furthermore, Professor Hafen's reasoning contains a logical fallacy.
While one must possess a right in order to exercise it, an inability to
exercise that right does not mean that one does not possess it.223 Thus,
just as an adult, a child may possess a substantive right but justifiably
be prevented from exercising it. The importance of this distinction lies
in the significance of possessing a constitutional right.
Conceptually, possession is important for two reasons. First, it is
implicit that an affirmative act is required to remove the right. 24 Once
a person possesses something, unless he or she voluntarily gives it up,
an affirmative action is necessary to take it away. Second, state action
which abridges a constitutional right will be subject to review by the
Court. States will be forced to justify their laws respecting children by
meeting constitutional review standards.22 Children will benefit
219. Id. at 647-48.
220. I refer here to cases involving very young children or incompetent children.
221. Richards, supra note 57, at 31.
222. This idea does not deny the importance of guidance from parents and other concerned
adults. Such nurturing and guidance unquestionably plays a vital role in the development of
children, especially in their early years. Further, in most cases the influence of the parent or
other adult will continue to impact children throughout their minority. Children can and should
continue to receive such guidance from adults, but they must be free to explore independent
interests and develop their own identity.
223. Melton, supra note 165, at 24.
224. An affirmative act is often the requisite act for imposing a duty on a third party to
protect one's constitutional rights. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989); infra text accompanying notes 254-57.
225. This may mean strict scrutiny, see, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42
(1942) (noting that under strict scrutiny, a state must demonstrate a compelling state interest and
legislation which is narrowly tailored to accomplish its goal to justify abridging a fundamental
right); intermediate scrutiny, see, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 446-47 (1985) (stating that a state had to show that its legislation distinguishing between
mentally retarded persons and others was rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose
to withstand equal protection scrutiny); or rational basis review, see, e.g., New York City Transit
Auth. v. 1eazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592-94 (1979) (noting that a state must have a rational basis for
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because legislators will have to consider the independent interests of
children when promulgating new laws.
Limitations on children's substantive rights have also been justified
because crediting the autonomy interest of children is inconsistent with
parents' fundamental rights to control their children.226 While this
reasoning may justify limiting the complete autonomy of children, it
does not logically lead to the conclusion that children should not possess
rights. As previously noted, the possession and exercise of rights are
independent propositions. Parents may control the upbringing of their
children and respect the values which the possession of rights
connotates. In fact, the Court's own reasoning suggests that parents
should have a duty to protect these values by respecting the rights of
children.'2 7
V.

CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The foregoing section of this Note made the argument that children
should possess the same constitutional rights that adults possess. This
section attempts to reconcile that theoretical conclusion with the
practical concerns created by children's limited capacity for rational
decisionmaking.
Initially, it is important to distinguish very young children from those
who have entered adolescence. If the capacity to make responsible
decisions remains the benchmark for allowing the free exercise of
rights2" then adolescents should have the opportunity to demonstrate
this ability. The rationale for state laws which abridge the constitutional
rights of children will, in most cases, be that children lack
decisionmaking ability, and that allowing unfettered exercise of these
rights will be injurious to the children.229 These laws necessarily
assume that until the age of majority, children cannot make competent
decisions." Such an arbitrary231assumption should be the basis for
abridging constitutional rights. This assumption does not respect

classifying types of drugs prohibited for use by its employees in order to not offend the Equal
Protection Clause).
226. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 223-24 (implying that parental rights to control the
education and religious upbringing of their children was paramount to all other interests).
227. See, e.g., id. at 233-34 (respecting parental rights of control but only "if it appears that
parental decisions will [not] jeopardize the health or safety of the child").
228. Hafen, supra note 6, at 647.
229. Id. at 646.
230. Id. at 647.
231. This assumption may be the product of a cost-benefits analysis. Inquiring into the
capacity of every child who wishes to exercise their rights would be a costly and time
consuming process. However, cost alone is not enough to justify the abridgement of rights. If
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children as individual people,232 and may impair the development of
the child's autonomy.233 Therefore, at the minimum, state laws which
abridge the rights of minors should always provide minors with an
opportunity to rebut the presumption of incapacity.
Very young children, those who clearly lack capacity, may justifiably
be prevented from exercising their rights. As noted earlier, constitutional
rights were intended to safeguard autonomy and the capacity for
autonomy." Therefore, preventing children from exercising their
rights conflicts with the constitutional goal of protecting a minor's
capacity for autonomy.235 This suggests that there should be an
alternative method of protecting a child's capacity for autonomy. One
means lies in defining the duty of parents and the State toward the
child.236
A. Estelle-Youngberg Analysis
In DeShaney, the Court found that the county was not liable because
it had no duty to protect Joshua.237 In reaching this conclusion, the
DeShaney Court reviewed two prior cases which describe when the state
acquires such an affirmative duty.238 The first of these cases was
Estelle v. Gamble. 9
In Estelle, a prison inmate alleged that prison officials violated his
Eighth Amendment rights because he received inadequate medical

this were so, the Constitution would be little more than a suggested list of rules subject to
modification at the whim of the states. But see id. at 648 ("To presume ... that rational and
judgmental capacities exist until the evidence demonstrates otherwise is to defy both logic and
experience.").
232. See Minow, supra note 5, at 3-5. In today's fractured society many teenagers have all
the responsibilities of an adult (employment, child-care, family support and the like) and yet they
do not possess the same rights as an irresponsible 18-year-old. Id. at 3-4. The adolescent, faced
with the inconsistency of this situation, may question her self-worth or ability to make decisions.
The laws which create this situation do not comport with ideals of human dignity which the
Constitution embodies. See supra text accompanying notes 171-83; supra notes 171, 183
(discussing human dignity, autonomy, and the Constitution).
233. See Melton, supra note 165, at 24-34 (discussing child development and autonomy).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 147-62.
235. Richards, supra note 57, at 20-21.
236. Minow, supra note 5, at 22-23. Professor Minow asserts that the shortcomings in the
juvenile court system and the Court's attempt to define the rights of children can be cured by
defining the duties of parents, children, and the state. Id. Additionally, Professor Minow sees the
need for courts addressing children's rights "to focus on the preconditions for relationships....
[Those conditions which] would promote settings where children thrive." Id. at 23.
237. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202.
238. Id. at 198-201.
239. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
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treatment after sustaining an injury.' Although the Court denied the
prisoner's civil rights claim,24 it did recognize that the prison officials
had an affirmative duty to protect his Eighth Amendment rights. 42 The
Court reasoned that because inmates must rely on prison officials to
satisfy their medical needs, the officials' failure to do so may result in
pain, suffering, or death for the prisoner.243 The Court stated " '[i]t is
but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot
by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.' ,
The second case in which the Court found an affirmative duty to
protect one's constitutional rights was Youngberg v. Romeo.245 In
Youngberg, the respondent, a mentally retarded adult, was involuntarily
committed to a state mental institution.' While institutionalized, he
was injured several times by his own violence and by other residents,
and spent considerable time in restraints.247 The respondent asserted
that the State had violated its duty to maintain conditions which
protected his constitutional rights," such as the right to minimal
training. 249
The Court noted that respondent had a well-established constitutional
right to freedom from bodily restraint and to be kept in safe conditions.25" The Court reasoned that in order to protect these rights, the
respondent was entitled to minimal training2 1 Thus, while "[a]s a
general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to provide
substantive services," 2 the states' affirmative act of incapacitating the

240. Id. at 99-101.
241. Id. at 107-08. The inmate sued under Chapter 42 of the United States Code which
allows a civil action to be brought when a state official deprives a citizen of any constitutional
right, privilege, or immunity. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The Court reversed the judgment
against a prison doctor, but remanded the case for a determination as to "whether a cause of

action has been stated against the other prison officials." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107-08.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 104 (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (1926)).
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
Id. at 309-10.
Id. at 310-11.
Id. at 315. Specifically, respondent asserted rights to safety, liberty of movement, and

training. Id.
249. Id. at 317.
250. Id. at 315-16.
251. Id. at 319. The Court limited its holding to minimal training necessary to protect safety
and freedom from undue restraint. Id. at 318. The Court did not decide the larger question of
whether a person committed to an institution is entitled to general facilitation training. Id. at
318-19.
252. Id. at 317.
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respondent gave rise to an affirmative duty to protect respondent's
constitutional rights." 3
The DeShaney Court rejected the Estelle-Youngberg analysis. The
Court stated that the affirmative duty established by Estelle and
Youngberg only applied when the State takes a person into custody and
holds him there against his will. 5 The Court emphasized that it was
the state's affirmative act of depriving a person of constitutional rights
which triggered a corresponding duty to protect those rights. 6
Therefore, because Joshua was not in the custody of the State when he
was harmed, the Court concluded that the State owed him no duty.257
B. The Duties of Parents
Generally, rights imply a complementary set of duties.2 8 Hence, the
right of parents to control the upbringing of their children may be used
to imply that they have certain duties toward their children. 9
However, the precise scope of parents' duties to their children remains
unclear.2 6 Without a guiding principle, children, powerless and
disenfranchised, must depend on a patchwork system of laws to define
parental duties. 6'
The Estelle-Youngberg analysis suggests a possible solution. Part of
parents' right to control the upbringing of their children is a right to
custody2 62 To the extent that an immature child's rights conflict with
these parental rights, the child may be prevented from exercising her
rights. Thus, the exercise of parental rights places a child in custody,
which may prevent her from exercising her rights. The EstelleYoungberg analysis instructs us that, in this situation, parents should
have the affirmative duty to protect the child's abridged constitutional
rights.2

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
a right to
U.S. 391,
260.
261.
262.
263.

63

Recall that children and adults should have the same

Id. at 317-19.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
Id. at 199-200.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 201.
STONE, supra note 96, at 139-40.
Minow, supra note 5, at 22-23. For example, the Meyer Court noted that parents have
"engage" teachers to instruct their children in a certain way. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
400 (1923). This right may imply a duty.
Minow, supra note 5, at 22-23.
See id.
Richards, supra note 57, at 28.
See supra text accompanying notes 240-57.
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constitutional rights.2" Therefore, parents' duties toward their children
should include protecting all guarantees embodied in the Constitution.
C. State Duties
The DeShaney Court attached great significance to the State's lack
of custody of Joshua.26 The Court implied that the State had to
physically restrain Joshua before the State would acquire any affirmative
duty to protect him." However, there is no logical basis for limiting
the Estelle-Youngberg analysis to situations involving physical restraint
by the State. Justice Brennan, dissenting in DeShaney, pointed out that
the Court previously had held that other actions, such as the monopolization of a particular path of relief, had placed an affirmative duty upon
the State.267 Logically, an affirmative action in any form which
prevents people from exercising their constitutional rights should be the
basis for imposing complementary affirmative duties. Therefore, when
states adopt laws or create regulatory systems which limit children's
avenues for relief or reinforce parental power that prevents them from
exercising their rights, the states should have an affirmative duty to
protect the rights of children.
The potential for conflict between state and parental decisions
regarding the rights of children should not foreclose this result. The
independent interests of the child must be protected. In another context,
the Court has held that a state can assert the independent interest of an
incapacitated person despite a conflicting assertion by family members.268 Furthermore, having two sets of duties toward children (state
and parental duties) is consistent with our principles of separation of
power.269 Parents alone cannot protect the constitutional interests of
children because they cannot divorce their children's interests from their
own interests.27 A dual system of duties to protect the rights of
children would fulfill the values embodied in the Constitution.

264. See supra text accompanying notes 184-85.
265. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
266. Id. at 199-200. The Court in DeShaney stated, "it is the State's affirmative act of
restraining the individual's freedom to act... through incarceration, institutionalization, or other
similar restraint of personal liberty-which ... [triggers] the protections of the Due Process

Clause." Id. at 200.
267. Id. at 207 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
268. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285-87 (1990).
269. Lupu, supra note 2, at 1330-34. Professor Ira Lupu states, "To guard against the threat
to individual liberties associated with the imperfection and corruptibility of individuals who hold
government power, American democracy relies on a system of divided government in which
different branches and agencies of government monitor and limit one another." Id. at 1321-22.
270. Id. at 1324-28.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Children's rights are a hotly debated and highly divisive area of law.
While the law has come a long way since the times when children were
viewed as mere property, it has not developed a clear picture of
children's contemporary legal status. This lack of clarity is largely due
to judicial application of incoherent jurisprudential principles to a
rapidly changing society. I suggest that the Constitution itself holds the
key to this dilemma. Adapting the philosophical models used by the
framers to contemporary societal structures suggests that the constitutional rights of minors and adults should be coextensive. This normative
conclusion can be integrated with pragmatic concerns about minors'
abilities to make decisions in order to create a new analytical framework
for children's rights.
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